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of fi nance and specialised services, has trans-
formed the social and economic structure of 
‘global cities’—i.e. those cities that “play a 
key role in the control and co-ordination of 
international capitalism” (Hamnett, 1994, 
p. 401). These global (Sassen, 1991) or world 
(Friedmann, 1986) cities exhibit an increase 
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Abstract
This paper discusses socio-spatial dynamics and the transformation of the residential 
building stock in the global city of Zurich. It deals with fi ve questions. Does Zurich 
exhibit the type of social polarisation outlined by the global city hypothesis? If so, how 
does social polarisation become visible in the context of a European city? Which actors 
in the real estate market are catering to the special tastes of the new urban middle 
class? With whom does the new middle class compete for space in the city? The paper 
argues that real estate developers customise the residential building stock and produce 
residential units for a targeted market—the new urban middle class. Furthermore, a 
new socio-spatial phenomenon—ennoblement—has evolved, as the new urban middle 
class takes residence in traditional upper-class neighbourhoods. By investing its own 
economic capital, this new middle class is hoping to profi t from upper-class social 
and cultural capital.
1. Introduction: Leading 
Questions, Case Context and 
Data Inputs
In her seminal work of 1991, The Global City, 
Saskia Sassen outlined the thesis that eco-
nomic growth, driven by the new complex 
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of both high-income and low-income 
workers, which results in greater occupational 
and income polarisation and constitutes 
both a social and socio-spatial polarisation 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Friedmann, 
1986; Sassen, 1991, 2001).
This process is driven by a new metro-
politan actor: the affluent consumption-
oriented class of high-income workers. These 
members of what could be called a new urban 
middle class are characterised by three traits 
that make them a new and important actor 
in the development of cities: rapid numer-
ical growth, a concentration in city centres 
(Sassen, 2001, p. 286) and lifestyles that are 
different from those led by either the sub-
urban middle classes or the traditional upper 
class (grande bourgeoisie).
There is still little literature on socio-spatial 
processes that are linked to the infl ux of the 
new urban middle class into the global city 
and its impact on the cityscape, especially 
with regard to Europe. The main thesis asso-
ciated with this process is that of social and 
socio-spatial polarisation. Yet does this also 
hold true for European cities? Who pro-
duces the built environment that conforms 
to the lifestyle and housing preferences of 
the new urban middle class? How do the 
members of this new middle class change 
existing neighbourhoods? Where exactly do 
they settle and what are the social classes they 
are competing with for residence? Against 
this background, this paper is guided by fi ve 
questions
(1) We explore social polarisation in the city 
of Zurich. Does Zurich exhibit the type 
of social polarisation outlined by the 
global city hypothesis (Friedmann and 
Wolff, 1982; Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 
1991, 2001)?
(2) If so, what does social polarisation mean 
in the context of a European city—i.e. 
is there a corresponding socio-spatial 
polarisation?
(3) How does the spatial distribution of 
investment in the residential building 
stock correlate with social change and 
the physical transformation of the 
building stock? For this purpose, we link 
changes in the residential building stock 
to changes in the respective neighbour-
hood’s social profi le.
(4) We identify the main actors who produce 
and remodel the residential building 
stock, and who are therefore responsible 
for the impressive physical change of 
Zurich’s cityscape. What kinds of actors 
in the real estate market are serving the 
special urban taste of the new urban 
middle class?
(5) Where, in the course of the new urban 
middle class’s infl ux, is investment in the 
residential building stock concentrated—
i.e. with whom do they struggle for space 
in the city? Is it only the lower class as the 
gentrifi cation hypothesis states, or do 
they also try to invade the strongholds 
of the traditional upper class, the grande 
bourgeoisie?
In a concluding section, we discuss the results 
and summarise the main fi ndings.
This paper explicitly focuses upon the city 
of Zurich for two main reasons. First, because 
Zurich is ranked as a European global city. 
With its 370 000 inhabitants (30 per cent 
foreigners), 330,000 employees (of whom 
89 per cent are employed in the services 
sector) and 195 000 dwellings, the city of 
Zurich is the inner core of a city-region of 
approximately 3 million inhabitants. It is also 
the largest and economically most power-
ful city in the polycentric urban system of 
Switzerland. Beyond the two major global 
players, UBS and Credit Suisse Group, there are 
about 410 Swiss and international fi nancial 
services fi rms and 92 banks headquartered 
in the Zurich city-region. Swiss banks cur-
rently manage one-third of the world’s private 
assets invested abroad. Nearly 50 per cent of 
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the city of Zurich’s tax revenues originate 
in the fi nancial services sector. Moreover, 
Zurich is the world’s third-largest insurance 
market and the Swiss stock exchange is the 
world’s eighth-largest. In addition, Zurich 
is a global player in key technologies: infor-
mation and communication technology 
(ICT), life sciences and high tech. Last but not 
least, during the past few decades, Zurich has 
become one of the leading global centres of 
the art market, with a signifi cant number 
of internationally well-established galleries.
Since the world city hypothesis was for-
mulated, Zurich has been classified as a 
‘world city’ (Friedmann, 1986). In the world 
city networks survey by Taylor et al. (2002), 
Zurich ranks as one of the 21 global command 
centres housing the headquarters of a set of 
100 global service fi rms that have offi ces in 
at least 15 different cities and with at least 
one offi ce in each of the three prime global 
markets: North America, western Europe and 
Pacifi c Asia. Furthermore, Taylor et al. (2002) 
classify Zurich as a gateway to emerging mar-
kets, a new strategic location from which fi rms 
choose to expand their geographical reach. 
In his latest survey, Taylor (2005) classifi es 
Zurich as a ‘world-wide leading city’.
Secondly, Zurich was chosen because of 
the quality of the data available at a very low 
level of aggregation. We thereby concentrate 
our research on the city of Zurich without 
taking into account the processes in the 
wider region. Concentration on this arguably 
small area can be justifi ed by our interest 
in shedding light on the upper end of the 
social strata. The new ‘gentry’ of the late 
20th and early 21st centuries are supposed to 
be mainly interested in living at the core of 
the metropolitan region, which is represented 
by the city of Zurich.
2. Social Polarisation in the 
City of Zurich
Although it is widely accepted that the phe-
nomenon of social polarisation is distinct 
from other concepts of social inequality, 
empirical studies are not always explicit in 
defi ning the term social polarisation (Walks, 
2001; Hamnett, 1994). The Gini coeffi cient 
and the income ratio, two classical indices of 
inequality, both measure income inequality 
in a given population. These measures de-
scribe income inequality as a widening gap 
between poor and rich. In contrast, the concept 
of polarisation describes an increase of both 
the poor and the affl uent strata, or of un-
skilled and highly qualifi ed jobs, parallelled 
by a decrease of the middle strata (Zhang 
and Kanbur, 2001; Rhein, 1998, p. 430), a 
movement towards a so-called hourglass 
society (Marcuse, 1989). In order to distin-
guish the two concepts of inequality it is 
important to note that polarisation does 
not necessarily imply a widening of the gap 
between the poles, but a concentration of the 
population at the two poles, regardless of how 
far apart they are.
In the context of this paper, ‘polarisation’ is 
treated as a process where the middle class is 
at the very least shrinking in relative terms. 
In other words, over a certain period of time, 
the number of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ residents 
grows faster than the number falling into 
the ‘middle’ (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991, 
p. 407). Harrison and Bluestone (1988) intro-
duce a method for the measurement of polar-
isation that captures the changing proportion 
of workers with earnings less than half the 
median (i.e. low-income earners) or over 
twice the median (i.e. high-income earners) 
over a particular period of time. We used this 
measurement for our Zurich case study.
We examine polarisation at two levels within 
the city of Zurich: social polarisation at the 
level of the city as a whole and socio-spatial 
polarisation at the level of 209 municipal 
tracts. The relationship between socio-
spatial change and building stock change has 
been analysed at the level of the municipal 
tracts as well. Three variable groupings are 
used in this research: socio-professional 
status, nationality and income.
2734  MARTINA KOLL-SCHRETZENMAYR ET AL. 
First, the socio-professional status data 
from the 1990 and 2000 census, made up 
of the person’s highest educational attain-
ment, current occupation and professional 
status, is used. It has been grouped into 
‘high-qualifi cation professions’ (senior man-
agement, graduate professions, liberal pro-
fessions), ‘medium-qualifi cation professions’ 
(intermediary professions, qualified non-
manual professions, qualified manual 
professions) and ‘low-qualifi cation profes-
sions’ (unqualifi ed employees and workers—
i.e. without occupational training).
Secondly, the national variable group has 
been divided into low-status and high-status 
foreigners. The ‘low-status migrants’ group 
comprises foreigners from Portugal, former 
Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Turkey, Latin America, Asia and Africa. This 
grouping is strongly supported by recent 
research on the correlation between socio-
professional status and the income of for-
eigners in Zurich (Heye and Leuthold, 2004, 
p. 24; Statistik Stadt Zürich 2005a, 2005b).
Thirdly, the income variable is based on the 
mean taxable income per tax-payer. In this 
context, one must take into account that the 
time-period analysed covers the collapse of 
the new economy boom in 2002. Hence, one 
can assume that an analysis of the following 
years might reveal lower values up to 2005 
and higher values if one includes the years 
from 2006 when stock markets once again saw 
sharp price increases. The socio-professional 
variable group is based on 1990 and 2000 
census data, whereas the income variable and 
the foreign nationality variables are datasets 
sourced from the Statistical Offi ce of the city 
of Zurich available for 1993 and 2002.
The proportion of highly qualifi ed indi-
viduals in Zurich’s economically active popu-
lation rose from 25 000 to 35 000 (or from 
12.4 per cent to 17.5 per cent) between 1990 
and 2000. Thus the group of highly qualifi ed 
urbanites grew considerably in both absolute 
and relative terms. Between 1991 and 2002, 
there was a rise in the number of Zurich resi-
dents in the top income tax bracket, from 
1.23 per cent of all tax-payers to 1.6 per cent, 
while the proportion of residents in the lowest 
tax bracket has more than doubled, from 
5.0 per cent to 10.1 per cent. The trend towards 
polarisation is even more pronounced when 
it comes to net worth, although much of this 
has been driven by the large movements in 
the stock market during the observed time-
frame. The number of low-status migrants 
rose during the observed time-frame from 
43 330 (1993) to 54 675 (2002), which cor-
responds to an increase from 12.1 to 15.2 per 
cent of the total population. Together with 
the increased number of unemployed people 
in the city of Zurich, these numbers are evi-
dence that there is both absolute and relative 
growth at the bottom pole of the income 
spectrum. Overall, the data support the social 
polarisation thesis for the case of Zurich.1
3. Socio-spatial Polarisation in 
the City of Zurich
According to the classical assumption of 
urban sociology, that the social structure 
of urban society leaves its marks on the 
cityscape, social polarisation must lead to 
socio-spatial polarisation. Thus it should be 
expected that in global cities the number of 
middle-class neighbourhoods will decrease 
and, in parallel, the number of both affl uent 
(or gentrifi ed) and deprived neighbourhoods 
will increase.
The analysis of socio-spatial polarisation 
has been conducted at the level of municipal 
tracts, dividing the city area as a whole into 
212 statistical sub-divisions. Based on a 
comparison of 1990 and 2000 census data, 
only 209 tracts could be included in the ana-
lysis because a reorganisation of municipal 
tracts had taken place between 1990 and 
2000. Although municipal tracts provide 
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a low level of aggregation, one can assume 
that homogeneous neighbourhoods may 
be transected by municipal tracts and that 
municipal tracts may contain several small 
socially homogeneous neighbourhoods. In 
both cases, the true extent of segregation 
might be underestimated.
Based on the social polarisation variable 
groupings described earlier, we constructed 
six social area categories. For the analysis 
of socio-spatial polarisation, the number of 
municipal tracts within the different social 
area categories was compared for 1990/93 
and 2000/02 respectively.
The six ‘social area categories’ are
– Low-status migrants: tracts within this 
category exhibit a comparatively high 
percentage of low-status migrants.
– Low-status migrants in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods: the characteristics of this 
category are a high percentage of low-
status migrants, a low percentage of highly 
qualifi ed inhabitants and/or a low level of 
mean taxable income per tax-payer.
– Swiss working class: tracts of this category 
are typically characterised by a low level of 
mean taxable income per tax-payer, a low 
percentage of highly qualified inhabit-
ants and, in most cases, a low percentage of 
low-status migrants—i.e. a high percentage 
of Swiss residents.
– Intermediate: tracts in this category ex-
hibit mainly medium values of all variables. 
Tracts characterised solely by a low per-
centage of low-status migrants or highly 
qualifi ed inhabitants that in other respects 
exhibited medium variable values have 
been assigned to this category.
– Transnational élite: the characteristics of 
this social category area are a high per-
centage of highly qualified inhabitants 
and/or a high level of mean taxable 
income per tax-payer. At the same time, 
the percentage of low-status migrants is 
low. The ‘transnational élite’ relates to 
Friedmann’s and Wolff ’s (1982, p. 322) 
“primary cluster of high-level business 
services which employs a large number of 
expatriate professionals”.
– Swiss élite: tracts in this category differ from 
the ‘transnational élite’ in exhibiting a very 
high percentage of Swiss inhabitants.
This social area categorisation, created using 
cluster analysis, essentially corresponds to 
the ‘mental maps’ of Zurich as seen through 
the eyes of its inhabitants and its real estate 
investors (see van Wezemael, 1999).
The number of low-status neighbour-
hoods, consisting of the fi rst three categories, 
rose by a small margin from 43 to 45. At the 
other end of the scale, the number of resi-
dential areas that can be assigned to high-
status neighbourhoods (i.e. transnational 
and Swiss élite) increased in the observed 
time-period from 23 to 33. While 143 of the 
209 tracts could be assigned to the ‘inter-
mediate’ group in 1990/93, by 2000/03 there 
were only 131 tracts left. This is evidence of 
a strong, but shrinking, middle stratum—in 
contrast to the number of tracts consisting of 
the polarised groups.
To summarise, we found a highly dynamic 
socio-spatial cityscape during the 1990s. An 
additional 10 000 highly educated inhabit-
ants had to fi nd a home. While there is clear 
evidence of a growing upper stratum that 
manifests itself spatially, the evidence of 
growth at the bottom end is less clear. In 
principle, these findings are in line with 
the world city theory’s hypothesis of socio-
spatial polarisation. However, in the case of 
Zurich, the growth is one-sided—i.e. only 
at the top end. This might partly be an out-
come produced by utilising municipal data. 
However, it is still astonishing how persistent 
the middle-class areas seem to be and how 
small the rise is at the lower end—a point 
taken up in the conclusion.
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4. Social Transformation and 
Physical Change
The interdependence between the change in 
social structure and residential building stock 
has been extensively discussed in the context 
of the world city hypothesis (Friedmann 
and Wolff, 1982; Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 
1991, 2001) and, moreover, linked to the well-
researched phenomenon of gentrifi cation. 
This theory suggests a spatial relation be-
tween investment in the residential building 
stock and upward social mobility. It follows 
that the infl ux of well-educated high-income 
workers to the city of Zurich between 1990 
and 2000—and their need for appropriate 
residential units—must have initiated invest-
ment in the residential building stock and 
with it physical change of the cityscape. These 
changes will have been manifested by new 
development, renovations and, last but not 
least, by demolition that produces develop-
able plots in certain parts of the city.
The Statistical Offi ce of the city of Zurich 
provides information on new buildings, 
demolished buildings and the renovation of 
buildings.2 For the purpose of this analysis, 
the geo-coded database, which contains 
information about each single building 
in the city of Zurich, has been aggregated to 
the municipal-tract level. We then related 
a municipal tract’s social profi le and ‘social 
career’ to the physical change in its residen-
tial building stock. Physical changes in the 
residential housing stock of a municipal 
tract, as utilised in Tables 1–3, are measured 
by the percentage of the 2002 residential 
housing stock (measured by the building 
volume in cubic metres) that has been newly 
built or renovated between 1993 and 2002, 
and the percentage of the 1993 residential 
housing stock that has been demolished 
between 1993 and 2002. In the city of Zurich, 
undeveloped land available for the construc-
tion of new buildings is a scarce commodity, 
such that demolishing old buildings is a 
common means of freeing built-up parcels 
for new development. Hence the analysis 
of demolition, construction and renovation 
indicates upward physical change. However, 
the datasets of the Statistical Offi ce of the 
city of Zurich do not permit the measure-
ment of downward physical change as a result 
of disinvestment.
The link between physical change in the 
residential building stock and an area’s 
‘social career’ was determined by comparing 
the respective social area categories of each 
tract in 1990/93 and 2000/02, and assign-
ing the tracts to ‘advancement’ (positive 
social trajectory), ‘relegation’ (negative social 
trajectory) or ‘stationary’ (no change in social 
status). Because the different social area 
categories differ widely in their rates of phys-
ical change, comparison of ‘advancement’, 
‘relegation’ and ‘stationary’ is conducted only 
within the same social area category, although 
this reduces the number of cases that can be 
compared. As a consequence, comparison can 
only be provided for the following social area 
categories: ‘low-status migrants in disad-
vantaged neighbourhoods’, ‘intermediate’, 
and ‘Swiss élite’.
Table 1 compares the dynamic in the resi-
dential building stock of tracts that were 
assigned to ‘low-status migrants in disad-
vantaged neighbourhoods’ in 1993. Tracts of 
this social area category that changed their 
social profi le in a signifi cant way (i.e. im-
mediate or higher in 2000/02) were classifi ed 
as ‘advancing’. Since ‘low-status migrants in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods’ is already 
the lowest social area category and no further 
downward movement of the social profi le is 
possible, the tracts not advancing are classifi ed 
as ‘stationary’.
As could be expected, our fi ndings dem-
onstrate that the socially advancing tracts 
are accompanied by a greater dynamic of 
construction than the ‘standstill’ tracts. The 
percentage of renovations in the former is 
twice as high as in the latter, new construction 
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is about fi ve times higher and the percent-
age of demolitions about six times higher. 
These results support the hypothesis that the 
two processes of social change and physical 
change are correlated: the greater the social 
change, the more it is accompanied by 
building activity.
The same connection can be seen again 
for the ‘intermediate’ social area category in 
Table 2: the higher the increase in the social 
status, the higher the physical change. Yet 
in contrast to Tables 1 and 3, a movement in 
both directions—up and down—is possible 
and the differences between ascending and 
descending tracts are the most obvious. The 
seven tracts that experienced advancement 
from ‘intermediate’ to ‘Swiss élite’ are the 
tracts that experienced by far the highest 
building stock dynamic. They are even 
distinct from those tracts that in 2000/02 
were assigned to the ‘transnational élite’ 
(three times the rate of renovation and three 
times the rate of new construction). A clear 
connection between building stock dynamic 
and social change is also demonstrated by the 
clear differences between those tracts whose 
profi le had been unchanged and those that 
have experienced decreasing social status. In 
particular, the lower rate of new constructions 
in the latter case catches the eye. As can be 
expected, the physical deterioration of an area 
occurs when owners do not invest in their 
properties, and this is most likely to occur 
when the inhabitants’ purchasing power is low 
and there is no chance of a future increase in 
their social status.
Clearly, members of the ‘Swiss élite’ group 
cannot improve their social status further. 
Thus we can only check on the difference in 
building stock dynamics between the ‘rele-
gation’ and ‘stationary’ categories. The differ-
ences in the dynamic of new construction 
and demolitions are minor. However, they are 
in the expected direction—i.e. the building 
stock dynamic is slightly lower for the tracts 
that exhibit relegation tendencies than for Ta
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the tracts that do not experience social change. 
Only the renovation dynamics are easily dis-
tinguishable from one another.
Overall, the data presented support the 
highly plausible hypothesis that a strong 
correlation exists between building stock 
dynamics and social change. This correlation 
is especially strong in the areas that experi-
enced upward social mobility. In contrast, 
descending areas experience a very low rate 
of investment.
5. The Actors Behind Urban 
Change
The expansion of the new urban middle 
class is the driving factor behind these social 
and physical changes. However, in the main, 
they do not remodel the city’s physical land-
scape themselves. Who are the ‘real’ actors 
behind urban change—i.e. those who cus-
tomise the residential building stock and 
produce residential units aiming to appeal 
to the affluent new urban middle class? 
Four types of actor can be distinguished in 
Zurich’s real estate market: individual or 
co-owner proprietors, the city of Zurich (as 
proprietor of the residential building stock), 
(non-profi t) housing co-operatives and real 
estate corporations.3 Using the building 
stock datasets from the Statistical Offi ce of 
Zurich (see earlier), for each single municipal 
tract we are able to evaluate the share of each 
actor group in the total renovation activ-
ities and in new developments within the 
residential building stock.
For new developments, the most import-
ant actors are real estate corporations. They 
initiated 27 per cent of all new developments 
in the city of Zurich as a whole (measured 
in building volumes). However, their share 
within the municipal tracts of increasing socio-
economic status is considerably larger—i.e. 
in those tracts that changed from ‘low-
status migrants in disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods’ in 1990/93 to ‘intermediate’ in 
2000/02, approximately 99 per cent of all new 
developments were initiated by real estate 
corporations. In the other two social area 
categories exhibiting increasing social 
status, the respective rates are 51 per cent 
(‘intermediate’ to ‘transnational élite’) and 
63 per cent (‘intermediate’ to ‘Swiss élite’). 
This domination is even more impressive if 
we add to this the bulk of the new condom-
iniums. These are normally initiated not 
by end-users but by professional real estate 
developers. Of the city-wide new residential 
building stock, 13.3 per cent was registered 
as ‘condominium’, with a peak of 41.5 per 
cent in municipal tracts that remained in the 
‘Swiss élite’ social area category. Their share 
in the city of Zurich in 2005 was at 6.6 per 
cent of the residential unit stock, an increase 
of two-thirds over the past 10 years.
The city of Zurich as an owner of residential 
units accounts for 2 per cent of all new devel-
opments within the city limits, individual and 
co-owner proprietors for 20 per cent. The 
housing co-operatives hold a city-wide share 
in new-built housing of about 17 per cent. 
The majority of new construction activity 
by co-operatives could be observed in tracts 
that belonged in 1990/93 to the ‘intermediate’ 
social area category. Housing co-operatives 
are therefore still a broad ‘traditional middle-
class phenomenon’ in Zurich.
For renovation activities, the main actors 
are individuals or co-owners. In general, 
they do not exhibit a distinct preference 
for neighbourhoods with increasing socio-
economic status (although a slight fondness 
of this ownership category for renovation 
activities in tracts that had already been cat-
egorised as ‘transnational élite’ or ‘Swiss élite’ 
in 1990/93 is observable). Instead, real estate 
corporations once again concentrate their 
activities on promising neighbourhoods. 
Conducting about 15 per cent of all renova-
tion activities in existing buildings in Zurich, 
they are less active in this fi eld than in that of 
new developments. However, the real estate 
2740  MARTINA KOLL-SCHRETZENMAYR ET AL. 
corporations are especially active in tracts 
of increasing socioeconomic status: 17.9 per 
cent of all renovations in ‘intermediate’ to 
‘transnational élite’, 48.5 per cent in ‘inter-
mediate’ to ‘Swiss élite’ and 60.7 per cent in 
‘low-status migrants in disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods’ to ‘intermediate’.
Deeper analysis reveals that, as far as renov-
ations are concerned, real estate corporations 
do have a special preference for investing in 
the renovation of buildings built before 1919. 
This particular housing stock is historically 
concentrated in specifi c areas of Zurich and is 
considered especially attractive for the highly 
qualifi ed affl uent workers.
To summarise our fi ndings: real estate cor-
porations are the main actors in remodelling 
the built environment of Zurich according 
to the tastes of the new urban middle class. 
By concentrating their activities on areas with 
increasing socioeconomic status, they invest 
in new developments as well as renovating 
tasteful residential buildings from the 19th 
and early 20th centuries for the highly quali-
fi ed new urban middle class in promising 
neighbourhoods
6. Striving for the Good Urban 
Life and the Battle for Urban Space
Whether it is the ‘class of highly qualifi ed 
service workers’ in the context of the ‘service 
society’ (Häussermann and Siebel, 1995), 
Sassen’s (2000, 2001) ‘new class of high-
income workers’ in global cities or Florida’s 
(2005) ‘creative class’ linked with the new 
knowledge-based economy, the most obvious 
phenomenon is the emergence of an affl uent 
group of urban actors who are distinct from 
both the traditional suburban middle class 
and the grande bourgeoisie.
Summing up authors like Zukin (1987), 
Sassen (2001) and Florida (2002), it is pos-
sible to argue that this new class of affl uent 
urbanites substantially alters not only the 
social and physical but also the cultural urban 
landscape of global cities.
Hence the importance not just of food but 
of cuisine, not just of clothes but of designer 
labels, not just of decoration but of authentic 
objets d’art. … the ideal residence is no longer 
a ‘home’ in suburbia, but a converted former 
warehouse in ultra-urban downtown (Sassen, 
2001, p. 341).
This change reaches beyond the residential 
building stock. The striving for the good 
urban life in the form of consumption, social 
diversity, aesthetic promiscuity, hedonistic 
lifestyle and sub-culture results in a percept-
ible increase in bars, restaurants, clubs and 
the cultural economy. These processes of 
urban change are usually conceptualised as 
‘gentrifi cation’. Originally coined by Ruth 
Glass in 1964, the term gentrifi cation has 
since then been linked with the intrusion of 
better-off classes in run-down neighbour-
hoods, with their socioeconomic and phys-
ical upgrading into “new wealthy inner-city 
enclaves” (van Criekingen and Decroly, 2003, 
p. 2456) and with the driving-out of the 
former poorer inhabitants (unless dealing 
with the special case of incumbent upgrad-
ing). However, the new urban middle class is 
not only displacing the urban poor in order 
to generate desirable living spaces. A closer 
look at the areas where the new urban middle 
class is settling shows that two distinct types 
of area are emerging in Zurich.
The vibrant Zürich West is an example of 
the fi rst type—an area west of the city centre 
that has undergone the transformation from 
urban industrial heartland to a trendy new 
district. The processes observable in Zürich 
West are dominated by gentrification of 
brownfi eld sites driven mainly by new-build 
housing that primarily attracts the more 
bohemian clientèle of the new urban middle 
class. This development is also fuelled by 
the massive infl ux of the creative industries 
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that has established itself in this area since 
the 1990s due to the proximity of art colleges, 
as well as affordable lofts and studios in old 
industrial buildings close to the CBD.
Zürichberg is an example of the second 
type. This highly valued traditional upper-
class quarter of Zurich is dominated by 
detached housing from the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. The grande bourgeoisie 
kept control over this environment for a 
long period of time, staying in the inner core 
of the area. Zürichberg is priced at the top 
end of the market with house prices rising 
dramatically; rising prices in an already-high-
price area can be interpreted as a sign of the 
successful defence of a good address. Yet it 
is not only economic power. Paraphrasing 
Bourdieu (1983/1992), Pinçon and Pinçon-
Charlot (2000) point out that it is precisely 
the very combination of economic, cultural 
and social capital, which defi nes the strength 
of the grande bourgeoisie.4 They termed the 
process of creating, organising and defend-
ing the ‘beautiful neighbourhoods’ by in-
vesting economic, social and cultural capital 
‘la griffe spatiale’.
According to Le Galès (2002, p. 127) the 
families of the grande bourgeoisie still have 
the power to protect their neighbourhoods 
from nouveaux riches invaders. Following 
the thesis of la griffe spatiale, the members 
of the new urban middle class should not be 
able to buy a home in Zürichberg. However, 
the fate of Zürichberg offers evidence for 
a loosening griffe spatiale of the grande 
bourgeoisie over their traditional homesteads. 
The whole area has been dramatically ‘en-
hanced’ during the past two decades, with 
a peak in the housing market over the past 
5–10 years. These market dynamics have 
been tied to physical change as well. They 
have been continuing recently. For example, 
in the inner core of Zürichberg the number 
of dwellings increased from 19 152 in 2004 
to 19 352 in 2006 (+200 dwellings). The ‘con-
dominiumisation’ of Zürichberg includes the 
mobilisation of vacant lots and new-build 
infi ll housing, as well as the demolition of 
‘unsuitable’ housing stock, especially in areas 
dominated by detached buildings. These 
offer the opportunity to produce plots that 
can be developed with a view to maximising 
profi ts with respect to the fl oor area ratio. 
Recently, in the Zürichberg area even estate 
gardens belonging to old mansions have 
been covered with condominiums. The multi-
plying of condominiums in the Zürichberg 
area is an answer to the increasing demand 
for housing units suitable for the distinctive 
residential and budgetary requirements of 
the new urban middle class. Their growth 
resulted from the move of high-income 
workers into this privileged bourgeois resi-
dential area since the 1990s, thus getting 
into competition with the established grande 
bourgeoisie for the most favoured addresses.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
Overall, there is strong evidence of social 
polarisation (see section 2), but scarce 
evidence of socio-spatial polarisation in the 
city of Zurich (see section 3). In addition, 
our data demonstrate a clear positive cor-
relation between the social career of an area 
and the amount of investment in the built 
environment (see section 4). Furthermore, 
there is evidence that private real estate de-
velopers have been the dominant actors 
accounting for the housing dynamics of 
the city of Zurich during the past one and 
a half decades (see section 5). The share of 
these professional developers is distinctly 
higher in the promising neighbourhoods—
i.e. in tracts that experienced an upward 
‘social career’ or were already at the top. As 
the new urban middle class has fl owed into 
the city, the role of real estate developers 
able to customise the residential building 
stock to the requirements of this affl uent 
new class has become distinctly more 
important.
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Between 1990 and 2000, the nature of social 
dynamics is marked by the expansion of 
the upper social strata. Therefore, the social 
polarisation processes observed are in line 
with the global cities paradigm. However, 
the patterns of socio-spatial dynamics in 
Zurich are in contrast to the picture painted 
by Saskia Sassen. Neither slums, nor ghettos, 
nor fortifi ed enclaves nor gated commun-
ities can be found in Zurich. The structural 
upgrading taking place in Zurich more 
probably contributes to an upgrading of the 
entire city and to a desegregation of low-status 
migrants. Particularly in housing areas with 
the highest share of low-status migrants, 
intensive building activity has led to a decrease 
in their numbers, but without a detectable 
appearance of higher concentration in other 
quarters.
A fi rst explanation for these results lies in 
the limited scope of our research. Our data 
refer only to the city of Zurich. Some of the 
changes, especially at the lower end of the 
social strata, could have taken place beyond 
the city limits. To analyse the processes of 
socioeconomic change more adequately 
would require further research on a regional 
database.5
A second explanation could be that Zurich, 
contrary to relevant literature, is not a global 
city after all. Clearly, it lacks global city status 
in the sense enjoyed by New York (Hill and 
Kim, 2000). Also, Zurich does not have the 
racial problems of US cities. Additionally, 
it could be mentioned that Switzerland’s 
historical, non-central-city system and its 
fi rmly federal national structure all restrict a 
one-sided concentration of command func-
tions in one city. However, against this sec-
ond explanation it could be argued that it is 
not that relevant whether Zurich is a global 
city or not, because social polarisation in 
any case ought to show itself more clearly 
than is apparent from the researched data, 
as polarisation basically can be considered a 
phenomenon of developed service-economy 
cities—and, without a doubt, Zurich falls into 
this category.
Thirdly, historical and cultural character-
istics particular to Switzerland can be 
invoked. The lack of a monarch as well as the 
non-existence of an aristocracy made it pos-
sible for a bourgeois middle class to develop 
into a culturally and politically dominant 
power. Since the 18th century, Switzerland 
has developed into one of the most successful 
European bourgeois societies, whose basic 
principles and values are today still deeply 
ingrained (Dahrendorf, 2005). In addition, 
despite the persistence of exclusionary mech-
anisms, fi rst affecting the working class, then 
women and now immigrants, Swiss society 
exhibits today a “remarkable openness and 
notable integration potential” (Hettling, 
1998, pp. 229; Tanner, 2005). Therefore, 
Zurich’s city politics have for a long time been 
explicitly oriented towards social and spatial 
integration.
The fourth explanation for this discrep-
ancy lies in the role of the European welfare 
state. Unlike, for example, the US, in Europe 
the negative effects of the structural changes 
in the economy are noticeably less visible 
within the formal employment market. 
Trade union wage politics and the social in-
surance system ensured a long-term stabil-
isation of a broad middle class. Yet under 
conditions of economic structural change this 
stabilisation has a Janus face: on the one hand, 
trade union wage politics reduce the size of 
the low-income sector and, on the other hand, 
welfare state provisions facilitate economic 
survival in the absence of paid employment. 
Hence, the form in which the costs of the 
structural economic changes become visible 
is not low-wage labour inside the labour 
market, but exclusion in unemployment and 
informal forms of work (Häussermann and 
Siebel, 1995; Hamnett, 1996a, 1996b, 2003; 
Kronauer, 2002).
The reason why this exclusion has to a large 
extent remained invisible in the city structure 
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has to do with the role of the European wel-
fare state and with the social housing politics 
in particular. These have created and main-
tained a segment of housing provision un-
related to the market (among others, social 
housing, accommodation allowance and co-
operatives). Until today, this has successfully 
prevented the careers people have in the 
labour markets from determining their status 
in the housing market, as is the case in US 
cities. In 2003, about 37 300 out of a total 
of 200 600 apartments in the city of Zurich 
were owned by co-operatives and another 
14 700 by public institutions. Thus the share 
of market-distant segments of the housing 
market amounts to one-quarter. In addition 
to that, the unemployment rate in Zurich, as 
in the whole of Switzerland, is at the lowest 
edge of the range when compared with other 
industrial nations.
A fi fth and perhaps most important ex-
planation is based on the particular features 
of the European city. The European city is 
not only a welfare state-regulated but also a 
regulating city; whereas the US city is a ‘mar-
ket city’ (Marcuse, 2004). Since the Middle 
Ages, communal administrations in Europe 
have considered it their responsibility to 
see that the social, economic and physical 
development of the city takes place in an 
orderly and appropriate manner. And the 
European city is the place from which the 
bourgeoisie originates. This is the basis for a 
politically and economically very infl uential 
stratum of burghers committed to maintain-
ing the testimony of their own history for the 
benefi t of the city. In the middle of the 1980s, 
a referendum prevented the construction of 
skyscrapers in Zurich. This has prevented 
the development of a dense central business 
district, as can be found in other global cities 
(such as New York City, London, Tokyo or 
Frankfurt/Main). Apparently the burghers of 
Zurich have fi rmly embodied the traditional 
form of the European city in their concept 
of their city’s identity. The dimension of this 
political foundation in European cities is 
shown in the presence of history and collective 
memory. It reveals itself impressively in the 
protection of historical monuments, provided 
with substantial money and appeal. Extensive 
funding of urban renewal has been supported 
by the tradition of the welfare state. It is thus 
the double tradition of the European city as a 
socially responsible political subject of its own 
development and as a place of emancipation 
for the citizens (Siebel, 2004) that up to now 
has effectively prevented the transformation 
of social polarisation into the socio-spatial 
structure of the city on display in US cities.
The phenomena recently observed in the 
traditional bourgeois neighbourhood of 
the Zürichberg show that la griffe spatiale 
of the grande bourgeoisie is diminishing 
(see section 6). Two explanations are plaus-
ible. First, during the past few years, the value 
gap in the real estate market of Zürichberg has 
increased tremendously. As the replacement 
of residential building stock and the develop-
ment of estate gardens becomes more and 
more profi table, even conservative bourgeois 
proprietors are tempted into the market-
place. Some of the landlords participating 
in the dynamic property market by cus-
tomising their property to the new urban 
middle class demand even seem to be in 
need of transferring (parts of) their inherited 
property to liquid assets in order to be able to 
hold their inheritance.
Secondly, one could point to the eclipse 
of the grande bourgeoisie as a class in which 
economic power was personalised and 
inheritable. In the wake of globalisation, 
economic power gets depersonalised and 
delocalised. The new global players have 
their headquarters somewhere in the CBD 
but, unlike Krupp—the industrial tycoon 
of the Ruhr residing in the Villa Hügel in 
Essen—Credit Suisse or a hedge fund does not 
have a ‘family home’. Economic power is only 
temporarily bound to specifi c individuals 
and it is less and less inheritable. CEOs of 
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global companies mostly take offi ce only for 
a couple of years and then leave for the next 
challenge. Hence, their ability to imprint 
their personal habits and tastes on the city-
scape durably is diminished.
Debates about the social division of space 
and the phenomena of social fragmentation 
and spatial polarisation focus mostly on the 
bottom end of the social strata. The global 
city literature (see, for example, Sassen, 1991, 
2001) emphasises the emergence of the new 
urban middle class and the rising numbers of 
low-educated low-income workers. It argues 
that the competition between these two classes 
for urban space usually leads to increasing 
economic inequality between neighbour-
hoods, residential segregation, gentrifi cation, 
intensifi ed discrimination and, eventually, 
to the exclusion of the not-so-well-off from 
the gentrifi ed neighbourhoods. The analysis 
presented in this paper (see section 6) gives 
strong evidence that the phenomenon of 
competition for urban space occurs not only 
between the lower and the upper end of the 
social strata but within the upper stratum 
as well. Since ‘gentrifi cation’ theorises the 
upgrading of low-status neighbourhoods, 
the term is not suitable either to defi ne the-
oretically or to capture empirically the social 
struggle for the most desired locations in-
volving the upper class and the new urban 
middle class. Instead, we propose the term 
‘ennoblement’.
The new urban middle class—the nouveaux 
riches of our time—that infi ltrates the former 
strongholds of the old upper class, does not 
do this solely in quest of élite housing but 
in order to ‘participate’ in the social prestige 
and social networks of the grande bourgeoisie 
by living on its turf. The affl uent workers 
invest considerable amounts of economic 
capital in a home in a traditional grande 
bourgeoisie neighbourhood in order to 
transform this economic capital into social 
and cultural capital and, in doing so, become 
a part of the upper class. This process can be 
labelled ‘ennoblement’. While in the course of 
gentrifi cation a low-status area is upgraded by 
pioneers and their hip scene and later on by 
more well-off residents, ennoblement works 
the other way around: here, the historically 
accumulated prestige of an upper-class area 
helps the newcomers to achieve a higher 
status. While the process of gentrifi cation im-
plies the transformation of social and cultural 
capital into rising real estate values and with 
that into economic capital, ennoblement 
means the transformation of economic cap-
ital into social and cultural capital.
The city functions as an ‘exchange offi ce’ 
via the dynamics of the real estate market 
by transforming one of Bourdieu’s types of 
capital into another one. Intelligent devel-
opers have known this for a long time and 
consequently tempt artists, musicians and 
students with low rents into their run-down, 
deteriorating locations, hoping that these, as 
pioneers, initiate a vibrant scene which later 
on leads to an ‘in-quarter’ with rising real 
estate values. Subsequently, the pioneers are 
priced out of the area. Yet if the city functions 
as an exchange offi ce by turning cultural into 
economic capital, it is by no means certain 
whether this process works as reliably the 
other way round.
In Zurich the intrusion of the new urban 
middle class into grande bourgeoisie neigh-
bourhoods has been accompanied by a 
doubling in the prices of condominiums. 
However, more dangerous than rising prices 
in the quest by the new affl uent workers for 
higher social status are the implications 
following from the densification of these 
neighbourhoods, affecting not only the built 
environment but also the social prestige of 
such areas. Even though the condominium-
isation of grande bourgeoisie neighbourhoods 
by infi ll housing and/or the replacement of 
older buildings seems at fi rst glance to be a 
‘success story’, one has to be aware that ‘suc-
cess might devour its children’: the social and 
spatial transformation of grande bourgeoisie 
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neighbourhoods in the course of the intru-
sion of the new urban middle class is not 
only a distinct sign of the attenuation of la 
griffe spatiale but might gradually undermine 
the very prestige of the neighbourhood. 
By remodelling a grande bourgeoisie neigh-
bourhood to the aspirations of the new urban 
middle class, the socioeconomic structure of 
the neighbourhood is inevitably changing, 
deteriorating in the sense that visible sym-
bols of an exclusive upper-class area are being 
lost. The social and cultural capital that the 
grande bourgeoisie neighbourhood captured 
in the past is being denounced as the nouveaux 
riches have successfully established residence. 
The invasion may have the qualities of a 
Pyrrhic victory.
Notes
1. The results for the lower pole do not fi t in the 
global city theory, because the proportion of 
workers in the lower ranks fell from 19.0 per 
cent to 10.7 per cent, which does not match 
the hypothesis of socio-spatial polarisation. 
Yet this contradictory result has to be relativ-
ised for three reasons: First, because of change 
in the survey methods. In 1990, the information 
forming the socio-professional status was still 
estimated by the interviewer, who actually called 
upon the interviewee. For the census count of 
2000, in contrast, a questionnaire was mailed 
out and the respondents fi lled in the informa-
tion on socio-professional status themselves. 
As a consequence, socio-professional status 
for one-quarter of the questionnaires could 
not be classifi ed. This explains the increase in 
the ‘unclassifi able’ category, from 8.9 per cent 
in 1990 to 24.9 per cent in 2000. Because the 
‘unclassifi able’ category also correlates strongly 
with little or no education/training, the ma-
jority of these cases could be assigned to the 
low-qualifi cations pole. If all of the nearly 
25 per cent of unclassifi able cases were to be 
assigned to this pole, then the result would 
actually be distinct growth in the lower pole. 
Secondly, in the same time-frame, the num-
ber of unemployed people rose from 4856 
(2.4 per cent) to 12 279, or 6.1 per cent (Statistik 
Stadt Zürich, 2005b). At the same time, the 
percentage of low-status migrants (as defi ned 
in the text) grew between 1993 and 2002 by 
3 percentage points. Here it also appears to 
be very plausible that the majority of both 
these groups should be assigned to the lower 
qualifi cation pole. Thirdly, it is highly plaus-
ible that a large portion of mainly unskilled 
and household services were performed by 
low-status migrants and informally (i.e. in-
formal sector), without appearing in the 
offi cial statistics. All three arguments suggest 
that the percentage of the working popula-
tion represented by the lower levels of the 
employment pyramid were systematically 
underestimated in the census of 2000.
2. The statistic records the renovation of a build-
ing if it is the subject of authorisation—i.e. 
if an offi cial permit is required. Although in 
other countries, informal practices of renewal, 
extension or renovation might be an import-
ant part of the alteration of and additions to the 
residential housing stock, in Switzerland this 
cannot be observed. Switzerland is renowned 
for its legalist habitus and social control through 
neighbours and this is especially true for 
housing investments. Depending on its phys-
ical dimension (in cm), even façade isolation 
requires permission. The city of Zurich controls 
physical change to building stock very strictly 
and declares that noteworthy illegal changes 
are investigated and all illegal building activ-
ities are fi ned (and (ex post) recorded) and/or 
demolished. This also is the experience of the 
authors. Therefore, we do not give estimates 
of informal or illegal investments.
3. The rate of  homeownership is low in 
Switzerland—i.e. traditionally, Switzerland is 
‘a nation of tenants’. In the Canton of Zurich 
in 2000, homeowners accounted for only 
about 25 per cent of households. Although in 
comparison with the rest of Europe Switzerland 
is still in the tail position, the share of owner-
occupied dwellings nation-wide rose from 
31 to 35 per cent during the past decade. Since 
the 1990s, the number of condominiums 
has increased particularly rapidly. Between 
1990 and 2000, an expansion from 4 to 8 per 
cent has taken place throughout Switzerland. 
Their share in the city of Zurich in 2005 was 
at 6.6 per cent of the residential unit stock and 
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showed a two-thirds increase over the past 
10 years. The share of condominiums in new 
construction in Zurich in the past few years 
amounts to about one-quarter and the trend 
is holding steady. Among the reasons for the 
increasing demand for owner-occupation are 
sinking interest rates and the option of early 
withdrawal of retirement funds.
4. Social capital in this context means to socialise 
with the ‘right’ people and cultivate valuable 
contacts and personal networks (such as 
membership of clubs and societies, attending 
gala dinners or charity performances) that are 
prerequisites for doing ‘big business’. Butler 
(2003, p. 2483) refers to social capital as “the 
sum of actual and potential resources that can 
be mobilised through membership in social 
networks of actors and organisations”. Cultural 
capital includes a cosmopolitan lifestyle (such 
as speaking a foreign language), participation 
in cultural life (for example, visiting museums, 
theatres, operas) and being a client of the art 
market.
5. However, according to Heye and Leuthold 
(2006), the patterns and degree of social segre-
gation in the city region and the city are quite 
similar.
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